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The challenges faced in calibrating poverty and welfare 
measures to objective data have long been recognized. 
Until recently, most economists have resisted a seemingly 
obvious solution, namely to ask people themselves: “Do 
you feel poor?” The paper studies the case for and against 
this approach. It is argued that, while one would not 
want to use self-assessments as welfare metrics in their 
own right, there is scope for using such data to help 
calibrate multidimensional measures. Indeed, the idea 
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of a “social subjective poverty line” (below which people 
tend to think they are poor, but above which they do 
not) is arguably the most conceptually appealing way of 
defining poverty. However, the paper points to a number 
of concerns that have received insufficient attention, 
including the choice of covariates, survey design issues, 
measurement errors, frame-of-reference effects, and latent 
heterogeneity in personality traits and personal tradeoffs. 
Directions for future research are identified. Poor, or Just Feeling Poor?  
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1.  Introduction 
Development monitoring and policy evaluation efforts have traditionally put a high 
weight on progress against poverty, defined in terms of household consumption or income as 
measured in surveys.
2 It is well recognized that household consumption or income aggregates 
need to be normalized for cost-of-living differences, including differences in household size, 
although there are differing views on how the normalization should be done. It has also come to 
be recognized that neither income nor consumption (even with seemingly appropriate 
normalizations) can be considered a sufficient statistic for welfare. Standard survey methods 
allow a fairly complete accounting of the market goods consumed (including own-farm 
products). However, there are important non-market goods that are typically excluded, such as 
access to public services for health care or schooling. And household aggregate income or 
consumption reveals nothing directly about distribution within the household.  
There have been attempts to define development indices that allow for these ―non-
income‖ factors. An early example was Morris’s (1979) ―Physical Quality of Life Index‖, which 
is an average of literacy, infant mortality and life expectancy. A now famous example is the 
―Human Development Index‖ (HDI), which aggregates life expectancy and education, along with 
income.
3  A recent example is the ―Multidimensional Poverty Index‖ (MPI) of Alkire and Santos 
(2010). This combines 10 components, two for health (malnutrition, and child mortality), two for 
education (years of schooling and school enrollment), and six for ―living standards‖ (including 
both access to services and proxies for household wealth).
4   
All such composite indices confront the problem of setting the trade-offs (relative 
weights) across their dimensions. This is essentially ad hoc in all these measures.
5 And there are 
objections that can be raised. For example, Ravallion (2012a) points out that the HDI puts a 
                                                           
2   For example, since the mid-1990s the World Bank—the largest international development agency—has 
deemed poverty reduction to be its ―overarching goal.‖ The first of the United Nation’s Millennium Development 
Goals is to halve the 1990s income or consumption poverty rate for the developing world by 2015.  
3   The index has been published since 1990 in the UNDP’s Human Development Reports; see, for example, 
UNDP (2010). 
4   For further discussion of the various approaches to measuring multidimensional poverty see Tsui (2002), 
Bourguignon and Chakravarty (2003), Alkire and Foster (2007), Wagle (2008) and Ravallion (2011). 
5   Furthermore, the weights are rarely explicit in the space of the postulated core dimensions of welfare. 
Instead, the weights are only made explicit in a derived space of pre-defined functions of those dimensions. Thus 
indices such as the HDI and MPI lack transparency about their assumed trade-offs. For further discussion of this 
point see Ravallion (2011). 3 
 
remarkably low monetary value on an extra year of life in very poor countries, and a very high 
value in rich ones.
6 The HDI’s weight on schooling in poor countries is also far higher than its 
weight on longevity, for no obvious reason. Recognizing that welfare is ―multi-dimensional,‖ 
and that income is an incomplete metric, does not mean we can credibly collapse the multiple 
dimensions into a single, uni-dimensional, space.  The essential problem is that we do not know 
the prices for valuation. (Indeed, if we knew them we would presumably have already formed a 
measure of full income.) Prevailing practice is essentially to make ad hoc assumptions about the 
welfare function (and hence the weights).  
The main aim of this paper is to review the issues raised by using subjective assessments 
of welfare (or ―well-being‖—I use the terms interchangeably) in both deciding who is ―poor‖ 
and calibrating multidimensional welfare measures. This is not a survey of the literature. Rather 
the aim is to assess the case for and against the use of subjective data for this purpose and to 
identify key knowledge gaps.  
Scientific research on subjective well-being emerged in the 1960s in psychology (where 
the emphasis was on measuring and explaining ―happiness‖ as a state of mind) and economics 
(where the emphasis was on calibrating welfare functions, including setting equivalence scales).
7 
The core data have long been respondents’ self-assessments in sample surveys. Each respondent 
is asked to rate her ―economic welfare,‖ or a broader concept such as ―satisfaction with life‖ or 
―happiness,‖ on an ordinal scale (sometimes called a ―Cantril ladder,‖ after Cantril, 1965). Or the 
respondent provides money metrics of points on qualitative welfare scales, such as the minimum 
income needed to ―make ends meet‖ (Hagenaars and Van Praag, 1985; Kapteyn et al., 1988) or 
for multiple points on a ladder (Van Praag, 1968).  
However, it would be fair to say that the use of such data in poverty and welfare 
measurement has stayed at the fringes of practice. In the eyes of some observers, such as 
Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001), the long-standing scepticism amongst economists about 
                                                           
6   The implicit value of an extra year of life in the new HDI introduced by UNDP (2010) varies from $0.50 
per person year in the poorest country to about $9,000 per person year in the richest (Ravallion, 2012a). 
7   An early contribution to the quantification of ―happiness‖ in surveys was Cantril’s (1965) idea of the 
―ladder of life.‖ Early applications of subjective welfare concepts in economics included Van Praag (1968), Kapteyn 
and Van Praag (1976) and Easterlin (1974).  4 
 
subjective questions is well founded, notably when these data are used as dependent variables. 
And poverty measurement is a field in which they are dependent variables. 
This paper offers a more positive, but still qualified, view on the scope for using 
subjective data in calibrating poverty measures. There are trade-offs. Subjective data come with 
problems and the paper tries to identify the main concerns. But it should be acknowledged that 
these data can provide welfare-relevant information that is simply not available in standard 
objective data—information that addresses some classic problems of applied welfare economics. 
After reviewing the economic foundations of the objective approach to poverty measurement in 
the next section, the bulk of the paper examines the subjective approach. Section 3 sets out some 
basic theory and compares the two approaches, while section 4 provides examples. Section 5 
discusses the problems faced in implementing the subjective approach and some potential fixes.  
2.   Poverty measurement and non-income dimensions of welfare  
There are various ―objective‖ approaches to measuring poverty, including setting poverty 
lines (Ravallion, 2012b). The approach with firmest roots in economics allows in principle for 
multiple ―non-income‖ dimensions of welfare, although these enter in a specific way, namely as 
shifters of the ―basic needs‖ demand vector needed to attain the poverty-level of welfare. This 
section reviews this approach, as a prelude to discussing the potential role of subjective data. 
The core idea is a utility function for individual i of the form  ) , ( i i x q u , where  i q is a 
vector of the quantities of commodities consumed, and  i x  is a vector of welfare-relevant ―non-
income‖ characteristics, including demographic characteristics of the household. The utility 
maximizing consumption vector is denoted  ) , , ( i i i x y p q  at price vector i p  and total expenditure 
on consumption i y . The implied indirect utility function is  ) , , ( i i i x y p v , giving the maximum 
attainable welfare at prevailing prices and characteristics. On inverting we obtain the expenditure 
function  ) , , ( u x p e i i  giving the minimum cost of utility u for person i when facing prices i p .   
In using this standard model for poverty measurement, poverty is thought of as being 
absolute in the space of welfare. The minimum utility that is deemed necessary to escape poverty 
is denoted  z u . The welfare-consistent poverty lines are then given by:  5 
 
) , , ( z i i
u
i u x p e z   (i = 1,…,N)             (1) 
On exploiting the standard properties of the expenditure function, this can be re-written as:  




i u x p q p z                  (2) 
where  ) , , ( z i i
c u x p q is the vector of utility-compensated demands. Thus we see that the welfare-
consistent poverty line is the cost of a bundle of ―basic consumption needs,‖ given by the vector 
of utility-compensated demands at the reference level of utility defining who is poor in the 
welfare space. The measure of aggregate poverty can then be defined on the vector of welfare 
ratios, {
u
i i z y / , i=1,..,N}.
8  The ―poverty rate‖ or ―headcount index of poverty‖ is the proportion 
of the population with  1 / 
u
i i z y .
9  
Three remarks are in order. First, notice that, even though individuals are ranked by their 
consumption expenditure, the implied poverty rate is consistent with that implied by the multi-
dimensional welfare function,  ) , ( i i x q u . This comes from the fact that a person is ―welfare 
poor,‖ meaning that  z i u u  , if and only if she is consumption poor, defined as 
u
i i z y  . (This 
follows immediately from the fact that the expenditure function is the inverse of the indirect 
utility function.) The fact that one uses an income poverty measure does not mean that one thinks 
of welfare as only depending on income. However, for income-based poverty measurement to be 
welfare consistent it is imperative that the poverty lines are adjusted for all relevant non-income 
dimensions of welfare. Adjustment for prices is common, but the only other adjustments 
typically done are for (almost invariably) household size and (sometimes) demographic 
composition.  It is in the practice of this approach that concerns about omitted ―non-income‖ 
dimensions of welfare become salient. 
Second, note that this framework allows for a measure of absolute income poverty. One 
can readily allow for a relative poverty line by supposing that the vector x includes mean income 
                                                           
8   The term ―welfare ratios‖ is due to Blackorby and Donaldson (1987) who discuss the advantages of this 
welfare metric over money-metric utility or ―equivalent income functions.‖  
9   A well-known problem with this measure is that it ignores distribution below the line; for example, if the 
poorest person becomes worse off or an inequality-increasing transfer is made amongst the poor then the headcount 
index is unchanged. There is a large literature on alternative measures; for a survey see Zheng (1997).  6 
 
of some reference group. If people derive utility from relative position then an absolute poverty 
line in the space of welfare will translate into a relative line in the space of commodities 
(Ravallion, 2008b).  
Third, the basic model above can be extended to encompass Sen’s (1985) argument that 
welfare should be thought of in terms of a person’s capabilities—the functionings (―beings and 
doings‖) that a person is able to achieve.  By this view, poverty means not having an income 
sufficient to support specific normative functionings.
10 A more general definition of the poverty 
line is proposed in Ravallion (1998, 2012b) whereby a person’s functionings are determined by 
the goods she consumes and her characteristics. (Functionings may also vary with the mean 
consumption of an appropriate reference group.) One can further postulate that utility is derived 
directly from functionings and interpret  ) , ( i i x q u  as a derived utility function, after solving out 
the functionings. Again, individual choices of  i q  maximize utility. Thus one can also postulate 
solutions for functionings, showing how they depend on income, prices and characteristics. 
―Functioning consistency‖ for a set of poverty lines requires that certain normative functionings 
are reached at the poverty line.
11   
The real challenges are in putting these ideas into practice. This requires that we address 
two classic problems in applied welfare economics. The first can be called the referencing 
problem: what is the reference level of utility (or other functionings) that anchors the poverty 
line?  (This is an instance of a general problem of reference-dependence, including in welfare 
measurement.) It is tempting to say this choice is arbitrary, and to hope that it is innocuous. But 
the choice of the reference in poverty measurement is far from arbitrary, since (in general) it 
affects the resulting poverty measure. This speaks to the importance of testing the sensitivity of 
poverty comparisons to the choice of reference, as it determines the level of the poverty line.
12  
The second problem is the identification problem. Even if we agree on the poverty line in 
the welfare space, we also need to know the expenditure function in (1). Standard practice is to 
calibrate its parameters from data on consumer demands. The problem is that individuals vary in 
                                                           
10   For example, following Atkinson and Bourguignon (2001), one can think of the normative functionings as 
comprising ―survival needs‖ and minimum ―social inclusion costs‖ for participating in social and economic activity. 
11   A more complete discussion can be found in Ravallion (2012b). 
12   This idea is made explicit and formalized in the use of stochastic dominance criteria for ordinal poverty 
comparisons (Atkinson, 1987; Foster and Shorrocks, 1988). 7 
 
characteristics, such as their household size and demographic composition, which can influence 
welfare in ways that may not be evident in consumer demand behavior. More precisely, if 
demands  ) , , ( i i i x y p q  can be integrated back to a utility function  ) , ( i i x q u  then the same 
demands also maximize the broader welfare function ] ), , ( [ i i i x x q u w . Thus there is no unique 
utility function that can be inferred from market demands alone.
13 We need stronger identifying 
assumptions, or more data. The rest of this paper will consider the scope for using data on self-
assessed welfare for addressing these problems. 
3.   Anchoring poverty measures to subjective welfare   
There are essentially two approaches to collecting subjective data on welfare. The first 
uses qualitative categories in the welfare space. An example is the ―economic ladder question‖ 
(ELQ): “Imagine six steps, where on the bottom, the first step, stand the poorest people, and on 
the highest step, the sixth, stand the rich (show a picture of the steps). On which step are you 
today?” A popular indicator of overall welfare has been the ―satisfaction with life‖ (SWL) 
question: “Overall, how satisfied (content, happy) are you with your life?  Are you (1) very 
unsatisfied; (2) unsatisfied; (3) neither unsatisfied nor satisfied; (4) satisfied; (5) very satisfied?” 
The ELQ is arguably better suited to poverty measurement as it is tied to a concept of economic 
welfare, while ideas such as SWL or ―happiness‖ are broader and more nebulous in scope. 
The second approach asks for a money-metric of subjective welfare. An example is the 
―minimum income question‖ (MIQ): “What income level do you personally consider to be 
absolutely minimal? That is to say that with less you could not make ends meet.” This can be 
thought of as a special case of Van Praag’s (1968) ―income evaluation question,‖ which asks 
what income is considered ―very bad,‖ ―bad,‖ ―not good,‖ ―not bad,‖ ―good,‖ ―very good.‖   
There are three main ways such data have been used to inform poverty measurement. The 
first is as a means of testing objective poverty lines, by regressing self-rated welfare on income 
normalized by the poverty line plus the variables that went into the construction of the poverty 
line, which should be jointly insignificant if those lines accord with subjective welfare.
14 The 
second is to calibrate a composite welfare index using the subjective welfare regression 
                                                           
13   This point has long been recognized; see Pollak and Wales (1979), Pollak (1991) and Browning (1992). 
14   This approach is outlined in Ravallion and Lokshin (2002) and illustrated using Russia’s poverty lines. 8 
 
coefficients as the weights.
15 The third way is to derive a poverty line in the income space, 
defined as the income level at which some critical level of subjective welfare is reached in 
expectation. Notice that, as long as higher income is valued positively in subjective welfare, the 
latter two methods are equivalent in terms of their implied poverty rate (proportion of the 
population living in poverty) for any given poverty line in the space of subjective welfare. As 
noted in the previous section, the fact that one uses income as the ranking variable does not mean 
that one is ignoring non-income dimensions of welfare given that these are allowed to alter the 
poverty line consistently with their welfare weight.
16   
It is well-recognized that there are differences in self-assessments that do not pertain to 
economic welfare. One might define as poor all those who put themselves below some fixed 
rung of the ELQ or all those with income less than their answer for the MIQ. However, one must 
allow for heterogeneity, such that people at the same standard of living give different answers to 
the subjective welfare question, or that the same person may give a different answer depending 
on when they are interviewed. These variations could stem from idiosyncratic ―mood‖ effects, 
personality traits, or simply errors. It is not one’s stated perception of own-welfare in an 
interview that is taken to be the relevant metric, as this is bound to contain many factors that one 
would not deem relevant. Rather, the subjective questions are used to calibrate an inter-
personally comparable welfare function based on observed covariates deemed to be relevant on a 
priori grounds. It is the role of these data sources in calibration that is the present focus.  
Let us take a closer look at one approach. This recognizes that any definition of poverty 
must be broadly accepted in the specific context it is being used. It makes little sense to use a 
poor country’s poverty line in a rich country; indeed, it is unlikely that anyone in the US or 
Western Europe lives below the poverty lines found in the poorest countries, at around $1 a day. 
And if one used the US poverty line in India (say) one would find that all but 5% of the 
population is poor (Ravallion, 2010); it is extremely unlikely that most Indians would agree, and 
nor does a poverty rate of 95% help much in thinking about how best to fight poverty in India. 
The idea of a ―social subjective poverty line‖ (SSPL) is a natural way of defining poverty in a 
                                                           
15   Examples are found in Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Van Praag (2001) and Kingdon and Knight (2006). 
16   This point is a common source of confusion in the more applied literature and policy-related discussions on 
multidimensional poverty measurement where ―income poverty‖ is often counterpointed to ―multidimensional 
poverty.‖ Plainly the two approaches are equivalent when calibrated to the same welfare function. 9 
 
specific context. The SSPL can be defined as the income below which people tend to think they 
are poor in the specific setting and above which they tend to think they are not poor.  
The standard representation of this approach in the literature is essentially a statistical 
model of the following form. Let 
min
i y denote the answer given by person i to the MIQ and write: 
  i i i i i i x y p y E y    ) , , (
min min               (3) 
where  ) , , (
min
i i i i x y p y E is the conditional mean—the regression function—given  actual income 
y, which lies in the interval  ] , [ 1 0 y y , prices and other relevant characteristics, and  i  is a zero-
mean error term.  It is assumed that  ) , , (
min
i i i i x y p y E  is strictly increasing in y. It can also be 
assumed that  0 0
min ) , , ( y x y p y E i i   and  1 1
min ) , , ( y x y p y E i i  , in which case it is plain that 
there exists a unique fixed point such that: 
) , ( ] , ) , ( , [
min
i i i i i i i x p z x x p z p y E              (4) 
The social subjective poverty line (SSPL) is then the (unique) solution of (4) for  ) , ( i i x p z . If 
higher p or x is associated with higher 
min y then a higher SSPL will be required. 
  The conceptual links between the objective, utility-based, approach (section 2) and the 
two approaches to subjective welfare—the direct approach of asking the respondent’s position on 
a welfare ladder and the approach of asking for a monetary valuation—have never been clear in 
the literature, and the three approaches have largely existed independently. It is of interest to ask 
under what conditions they will be consistent in terms of whom they identify as ―poor.‖ Clearly 
this requires that all three are anchored to the same continuous welfare function. It is evident that 
the direct approach will be consistent with the objective utility-based approach as long as the 
ordinal qualitative questions asked of respondents stem from the same welfare index. This is a 
judgment call, and some observers may not accept that (say) SWL is driven by ―utility.‖  
Establishing consistency for the SSPL approach requires that we introduce some 
economic structure into the statistical model of the SSPL, as above. We can assume that the MIQ 
attempts to find
min
i y such that:
  10 
 
   
r
i i i i u x y p v  ) , , (
min                    (5) 
where 
r
i u  is the level of utility that person i thinks is implied by ―making ends meet.‖ This is 
assumed in turn to be a strictly increasing function of actual utility:  
)] , , ( [ i i i
r
i x y p v u                   (6) 
Equation 3 can now be interpreted as the solution of (5) and (6) for
min
i y . The SSPL in the income 
space is then found as the solution to: 
    )] , , ( [ ) , , ( i i i i i i x z p v x z p v                 (7) 
But now we see that there is also a SSPL in welfare space,  z u , at which point: 
) ( z z u u                      (8) 
(The solution is unique if  0 0) ( u u   and  1 1) ( u u   , where utility is bounded below by  0 u and 
above by  1 u .) Comparing (7) and (8) we see that  ) , , ( i i i z x z p v u  . The SSPL—the point at which 
i i y y 
min —also identifies those who just reach the implicit welfare poverty line z u  and the set of 
people who are welfare poor ( z i u u  ) is the same as the set of income poor ( i i z y  ). Thus, 
under these conditions, the SSPL approach can be said to be consistent with the other two 
approaches, in that they identify the same people as poor and deliver the same poverty rate.  
4.  Methods and examples 
The most common method of empirical investigation in this literature has been a 
regression of the survey responses on subjective welfare on individual and household 
characteristics, including age, gender, income, education, employment status and household 
demographics.
17 Typically the researcher has data on subjective welfare (SW) across N survey 
                                                           
17   Examples include van Praag (1968), van de Stadt et al. (1985), Clark and Oswald (1994, 1996), Kapteyn et 
al. (1998), Easterlin (1995), Oswald (1997), Winkelmann and Winkelmann (1998), Pradhan and Ravallion (2000), 
McBride (2001), Ravallion and Lokshin (2001, 2002, 2010), Graham and Pettinato (2002), Senik (2004), Luttmer 
(2005), Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2005), Herrera et al. (2006), Bishop and Luo (2006), Kingdon and Knight (2006, 2007), 
Fafchamps and Shilpi (2009), Knight and Gunatilaka (2010) and Castilla (2010). 11 
 
respondents and a set of covariates (X, including some suitable non-linear function of income) 
and postulates a regression model of the form: 
i i i X SW         (i=1,..,N)            (9) 
where the error term,  , is uncorrelated with X. If using ordinal data from a ladder question then 
an ordered response estimator is typically used, such as the ordered probit, in which case (9) is 
the underlying continuous variable generating the ordinal responses relative to thresholds that are 
taken to be fixed. If instead one is using the MIQ, then 
min
i y is the dependent variable.  
This section provides an overview of some of the lessons to date in estimating such a 
model. The next section will discuss a number of issues in estimating such a regression. 
Recall that one of the conditions for existence of a SSPL is that subjective welfare is an 
increasing function of income. This is invariably indicated in cross-sectional studies; indeed, I 
have not seen an exception in the literature though some studies find stronger income effects 
than others.
18 Stevenson and Wolfers (2008) argue that the income effect on subjective well-
being is robust across countries, within countries, and over time. 
There have been some estimates of SSPLs.
19 Interestingly, the estimates to date suggest 
that the overall poverty rate based on the SSPL is roughly similar to that implied by objective 
poverty lines.
20 It may well be that the choice of parameters in the ―objective‖ absolute lines 
already approximated the expected SSPL in the specific context.  
However, the structure of the poverty profile has turned out to be different in some 
respects. While objective poverty lines often imply that larger households are poorer, this is not 
typically the case in cross-sectional studies using the subjective approach, which tends to suggest 
greater economies of scale in consumption than normally assumed, at least in developing 
countries. For example, in using the ELQ to test the welfare consistency of prevailing objective 
                                                           
18   Clark et al. (2008) review the literature on the income effect on subjective welfare. 
19   I focus on application to developing countries. The applications to date include Pradhan and Ravallion 
(2000) using data for Jamaica and Nepal, Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Van Praag (2001), for Russia, Taddesse and 
Shimeles (2005) for Ethiopia, Gustafsson (2004) for urban China, Lokshin et al. (2006) for Madagascar, Bishop and 
Luo (2006) for urban China and Carletto and Zezza (2006) for Albania.  
20   An exception to this finding is reported for the US by de Vos and Garner (1991), where the SSPL is well 
above the prevailing (absolute) line, though the US line has not been updated in real terms since the 1960s; a more 
current absolute line for the US would probably be closer to the SSPL. 12 
 
poverty lines for Russia, Ravallion and Lokshin (2002) find some striking differences in the 
properties of the equivalence scale. The objective poverty lines had an elasticity of 0.8 to 
household size, while the subjective indicator called instead for an elasticity half this size.
21      
Subjective data have thrown new light on the long-standing debate on whether poverty is 
―absolute‖ or ―relative.‖ The position one takes on this issue is crucial to whether one believes 
that economic growth reduces poverty. If the poverty line has an elasticity of zero to the poverty 
line then growth tends to reduce poverty, but this ceases to be true at an elasticity of one 
(Ravallion, 2003). However, one finds little support for the idea of a relative poverty line set at a 
constant proportion of the current mean income. Poverty lines calibrated to subjective welfare 
tend to rise with mean income but with an elasticity less than unity, suggesting that they are more 
like the ―weakly relative poverty lines‖ defined by Ravallion and Chen (2011). Hagenaars and 
Van Praag (1985) estimated an elasticity of 0.51 for eight European countries. For the US, 
Kilpatrick (1973) estimated an elasticity of about 0.6 for subjective poverty lines and De Vos and 
Garner (1991) found an own-income elasticity of the US subjective poverty line of 0.43.  
A number of papers have reported evidence of effects on subjective welfare that can be 
interpreted as indicative of ―relative deprivation,‖ meaning that self-assessed well-being tends to 
fall as social comparators become better off, at given ―own income.‖
 22 Luttmer (2005) reports 
regressions for subjective welfare in the US that imply a particularly strong relativism, whereby 
own income does not matter to subjective well-being independently of income relative to the 
mean in the area of residence. (The next section points to some reasons to question this finding.) 
The bulk of the evidence has been for relatively rich countries. The work that has been done for 
developing countries has been less supportive. Senik (2004), Kingdon and Knight (2007) and 
Ravallion and Lokshin (2010) tested for relative deprivation effects in self-reported happiness in 
Russia, South Africa and Malawi respectively and found rather little support for the idea and 
even evidence of positive external effects of higher ―neighbors’ income,‖ rather than the negative 
effect predicted by the theory of relative deprivation. 
                                                           
21   Similarly, see Pradhan and Ravallion (2000), using data for Jamaica and Nepal, Bishop and Luo (2006), 
using data for urban China, and Rojas (2007) using data for Mexico. For a more general discussion of economies of 
scale in consumption in developing countries see Lanjouw and Ravallion (1995). 
22   See Oswald (1997), Frank (1997), Frey and Stutzer (2002), Clark, Frijters, and Shields (2008) and Clark 
and Senik (2010). Reviewing the evidence, Frey and Stutzer assert that ―There is little doubt that people compare 
themselves to other people and do not use absolute judgments‖ (p.412). This would seem to be over-stated. 13 
 
Figure 1: Nonparametric regressions of satisfaction with life against log consumption per 
person in Malawi, 2004 
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As an illustration, Figure 1 shows the relationship found by Ravallion and Lokshin 
(2010) in survey data for one of the world’s poorest countries, Malawi. The Figure gives the non-
parametric regression for responses to the ―satisfaction with life‖ question against household 
consumption per person. The Figure also shows how the relationship varies with the 
respondent’s assessment of the economic welfare of their friends and neighbors. We see that 
SWL increases with consumption, but higher economic welfare of friends or neighbors tends to 
come with higher satisfaction with life at given own consumption. So this does not support the 
theory of relative deprivation (as this would imply lower welfare with richer friends or 
neighbors, at given own consumption).  The parametric models presented in Ravallion and 
Lokshin (2010) did, however, indicate that concerns about relative deprivation emerged amongst 
the richer Malawians. Ravallion (2008b) calculated the implied (iso-welfare) poverty lines for 
Malawi, and showed that they exhibit a small weakly relativist gradient, whereby higher own-
economic welfare is needed to compensate people for having richer social comparators. 
These findings are echoed in the responses to survey questions on whether poverty is 
perceived as absolute or relative reported by Corazzini et al. (2010), which suggest that 
respondents coming from richer backgrounds see poverty as more relative, though not to the 
point that absolute poverty is seen as unimportant. 
Some of the literature has also thrown light on the role played by expectations. Ravallion 
and Lokshin (2002) find strong lagged income effects on subjective welfare in Russia, consistent 
with the view that that those on a positive (negative) income trajectory are likely to rate their 
welfare higher (lower) than others at given current income (and other covariates).
23 
Knight and Gunatilaka (2012) argue that ―aspirations‖ for higher income also matter 
negatively to subjective welfare, and that this mitigates appreciably the direct income effect. 
Using data for rural China they proxy ―aspiration income‖ by answers to a version of the MIQ 
and find that the latter has a significant negative coefficient in predicting SWL and ―satisfaction 
with income.‖ Aspiration income is in turn found to be an increasing function of own income 
(consistently with past research on the SSPL). They interpret their results as evidence of an 
―hedonic treadmill‖ whereby higher actual income need not raise happiness given offsetting 
                                                           
23   Ravallion and Lokshin (2000) also find that Russians on a positive (negative) income trajectory are also 
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effects on aspirations.
24 However, once one allows for latent heterogeneity in subjective welfare 
there are other interpretations of the Knight-Gunatilaka finding, as discussed in the next section. 
A number of papers have found evidence that unemployment lowers subjective welfare at 
given income.
25 This is not what the standard economic model of work-leisure choice would 
suggest, since unemployment at given income implies greater leisure, which is assumed to yield 
utility. (The welfare cost of unemployment is seen to be through the lost income.) There may 
well be an independent disutility of unemployment that is missing from the standard model, 
possibly associated with the quantity constraints on choice that involuntary unemployment 
entails or possibly stemming from social status roles played by employment. However, the 
welfare effect attributed to unemployment may also stem from latent heterogeneity in personality 
traits, which is one of the issues to which the next section turns.  
5.  Problems in using subjective data in measuring poverty 
Subjective data can offer a direct lens on welfare that is not available in standard 
objective data. But are subjective questions reliable, in the sense that one gets similar answers 
under similar circumstances? Studies of SWL or ―happiness‖ have found a worryingly high 
degree of variability. For example, Kristensen and Westergaard-Nielsen (2007) find that 20% of 
survey respondents in Europe gave a different answer on job satisfaction when asked twice 
within the same interview. Krueger and Schkade (2008) studied reported SWL for the same 
people interviewed two weeks apart and found the serial correlation coefficient was only 0.6.  
In the present context, it is not the reliability of the subjective welfare scores themselves 
that is of greatest concern, but the reliability of the regressions for subjective welfare, as used in 
calibrating social-subjective poverty lines, or measuring welfare more generally.  If the likely 
errors in subjective welfare data are white noise—classical measurement errors—we would not 
be concerned; the R
2 will be lower but the regression coefficients will still be unbiased under 
standard assumptions. However, there are good reasons to expect the errors in subjective data to 
be correlated with other explanatory variables of interest, as argued by Bertrand and 
                                                           
24   The authors note the endogeneity concern and provide instrumental variables (IV) estimates although it is 
not obvious that there is any theoretically valid IV for this problem. 
25      Examples include Clark and Oswald (1994), Theodossiou (1998), Winkelmann and Winkelmann (1998) 
and Ravallion and Lokshin (2001).   16 
 
Mullainathan (2001) and Ravallion and Lokshin (2001). That does not mean the regressions are 
useless. Biases can almost never be ruled out. The real issue is how large the biases are in 
practice, and whether they can overturn key conclusions, such as whether larger households are 
poorer or whether economic growth reduces poverty.  
This section tries to assess what appear to be the main concerns about the specification 
and interpretation of regressions for subjective welfare.   
Welfare-irrelevant covariates and missing data on welfare-relevant ones   
To assert that subjective welfare regressions should over-ride prior normative judgments 
puts a lot of weight on those regressions. There are concerns about both the variables included 
and the variables left out.  
Not everything that helps predict self-assessed welfare will be considered relevant to 
measuring poverty (or assessing welfare more broadly). In principle one can partition the X 
vector in equation (9) into two types of variables, those that are deemed (on a priori grounds) to 
be relevant to assessing welfare, and those that are controls for other factors, with the latter fixed 
at reference values (common to all individuals) when measuring welfare or poverty.
26 Thus the 
welfare metric becomes a predicted value as if the individual had the reference characteristics.  
Personality traits are a case in point. These clearly influence self-assessed well-being. 
While these differences are not often data, this is changing. Suppose that we control for 
personality in a regression for (say) SWL. The idea of a poverty line that is set at a higher level 
for people with certain personalities, at given levels of other relevant factors, is probably not 
going to gain much acceptance. Personality is unlikely to be given independent weight.  
And some more readily observed covariates may well be acting as proxies for 
personality. For example, a common finding in the literature is that unemployment reduces 
subjective welfare at a given level of income. If one included unemployment in defining the 
poverty line then one would conclude that the unemployed should have a higher poverty line 
than the employed, ceteris paribus. Yet other ―objective‖ approaches to setting a poverty line 
                                                           
26   This is proposed by Ravallion (1990) in the context of measuring undernutrition, though the analytics are 
formally identical. 17 
 
would not suggest that the unemployed need more income to attain the same level of welfare. 
And that may be the right call if the trade-off between income and unemployment implied by a 
subjective welfare regression is being distorted by latent personality traits.   
Nor are the data for X available ever likely to embrace all that matters to welfare. This 
approach is unlikely to provide a sufficient statistic for multidimensional poverty comparisons. 
(And it is unlikely that any approach would.) To estimate the regression function we ideally have 
the X’s from the same individuals as the indicator of subjective welfare. There is bound to be 
some relevant dimension of welfare left out, but hopefully available in some separate survey. In 
practice, multidimensional poverty measurement is invariably going to be a matter of devising a 
defensible set of multiple indices rather than one single composite index (Ravallion, 2011). 
Survey design and measurement errors 
Measurement errors are present in all areas of applied research. Naturally there are errors 
in survey responses on subjective welfare or its determinants. Three examples follow of why 
such errors matter to the conclusions drawn about the determinants of subjective welfare. 
(i) Incomes or consumptions are measured with error. Sometimes the income measure 
was built up from a detailed questionnaire, which is likely to be more reliable than other 
measures found in the literature based on very few questions, or even just one, ―what is your 
income?‖ The scope for attenuation bias in estimating the income gradient in subjective welfare 
is plain. 
(ii) An attenuation bias in estimates of the income (or other) gradient in subjective 
welfare can also arise from psychological adaptation to adverse circumstances. Poor people may 
try to cope with deprivation in ways that attenuate the true income gradient in subjective 
assessments of their well-being. For example, Lokshin and Ravallion (2008) found that the 
income gradient in the self assessed health status of Russians was greatly attenuated relative to 
that in their objective health status.    
(iii) Recall that a common method of testing for welfare costs of relative deprivation is by 
regressing self-assessed welfare on both own income and the mean income of ―neighbors‖—
typically the mean income of survey respondents in a geographic area that includes the 18 
 
respondent. However, the latter could just be picking up a spatial autocorrelation in income 
measurement errors, giving spurious social effects.   
The measurement of comparison-group welfare also poses a problem. In the near-
universal approach in the literature, the researcher must make an a priori judgment about the 
relevant comparison group.  Yet this can vary greatly from person to person. It has been argued 
that ―… comparisons are most salient if individuals perceive the reference person or group as in 
some way similar to themselves‖ (Kahneman and Varey, 1991, p. 140).  But that is based on the 
individual’s own judgment, given idiosyncratic informational and social factors that a researcher 
would have a very hard time observing in any systematic way.  Neither psychological nor 
economic theories of relative deprivation offer much insight into what constitutes the relevant 
comparison group. The researcher must make some potentially strong identifying assumptions.   
There are also concerns about survey design and implementation effects, including 
sensitivity to how questions are asked and the context. It is known that precisely how, and in 
what circumstances, one asks subjective questions matters to the results.  In survey data for 
Britain, Taylor (2006) finds that those interviewed on a Friday report significantly greater job 
satisfaction and less mental stress than those interviewed mid-week, controlling for other 
observed factors. Also for Britain, Conti and Pudney (2011) find that seemingly small changes in 
how questions on satisfaction with work were asked led to large changes in the answers obtained, 
particularly for women. Moreover, they find that the measurement errors are not ignorable, in 
that the distortions influence findings on the determinants of job satisfaction. They also find 
evidence of a ―put a good show for the visitor effect‖ (Conti and Pudney, 2011, p.1093)—
whereby there is an upward bias in reported welfare in open oral interviews relative to when the 
questionnaire is completed in private—and a ―not in front of the children effect‖ (p.1093), 
whereby there was another upward bias when children were present at the interview. These 
biases were found to be larger for women. Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) give other 
examples of how the ordering and wording of subjective questions can alter responses. 
Such problems are not confined to subjective questions. Seemingly objective questions 
can entail similar biases. My favorite (undocumented) example is from a colleague who was 
doing field work piloting a questionnaire and found a markedly higher literacy rate for a given 
population and date when asking ―are you literate?‖ than when using a direct test by showing one 19 
 
sentence on a card and asking what it said. (In this case the bias was greater for men.) While we 
do not normally think of literacy or schooling as subjective, such variables are not immune to the 
same biases.      
Some of the long-standing questions on subjective welfare in the literature seem 
problematic when one considers the scope for measurement error. While the Minimum Income 
Question offers an elegant solution to the problem of determining the SSPL, it comes with a 
problem, and it is a problem that is likely to be especially serious in developing–country settings. 
The problem is that the income concept respondents to the MIQ have in mind need not 
correspond to that used by the analyst in estimating the SSPL. This will bias the SSPL (Kapteyn 
et al., 1988; Tummers, 1994). In applying the MIQ in many developing countries, one will also 
find that ―income‖ is not a well-defined concept, particularly (but not only) in rural areas.  It is 
not at all clear whether one could get sensible answers to the MIQ.  
To address this concern, Pradhan and Ravallion (2000) propose a method for estimating 
the SSPL based on qualitative data on consumption adequacy. Instead of asking respondents 
what the precise minimum consumption is that they need, Pradhan and Ravallion simply asked 
whether their current consumptions are adequate. For example, their adequacy question for food 
takes the form: 
Concerning your family’s food consumption over the past one month, which of the following is 
true?            
Less than adequate   1 
Just adequate  2 
More than adequate  3 
      "Adequate" means no more nor less than what you consider to be the minimum consumption 
needs of your family. 
 
The question is then repeated for other components of consumption (for both market and non-
market goods and services).  
 
This provides a multidimensional alternative to the one-dimensional and difficult MIQ. 
The method exploits the structure of consumption—essentially providing a subjective welfare 
function for each component of basic needs. The SSPL can be defined as the level of total 
spending above which respondents say (on average) that their expenditures are adequate for all 
their needs or some sub-set.  Under certain technical conditions, a unique solution for the SSPL 20 
 
can then be obtained from the estimated parameters of a set of regressions for consumption 
adequacy; Pradhan and Ravallion (2000) provide a detailed exposition.   
Non-ignorable latent heterogeneity 
By ―latent heterogeneity‖ I mean that observationally similar people give different 
responses to questions on subjective welfare. These differences are ―non-ignorable‖ statistically 
if they are correlated with the dimensions of welfare for which one wants to derive weights. 
There are a number of reasons to be concerned about such heterogeneity. It has been argued by 
psychologists and economists that relatively stable (though not necessarily fixed) personality 
traits influence behavior in a wide range of domains, including behaviors relevant to economic 
welfare.
27 It appears likely that latent personality traits would be correlated with the observed 
socioeconomic characteristics that are often postulated as relevant to a multidimensional welfare 
index, as argued by Ravallion and Lokshin (2001). People with a latent tendency for depression 
may well be less likely to take care of their physical health. Unemployment may also be more 
likely for people with certain personality traits, such one’s ―work ethic.‖ These differences can 
be thought of as either differences in the meaning attached to the scales used in subjective 
welfare questions or a difference in the latent subjective welfare itself.  
To give a sharp example, suppose subjective welfare depends on income and personality, 
and we are interested in identifying the income poverty line corresponding to some fixed level of 
subjective welfare.  Personality is unobserved (and so relegated to the regression error term), but 
is known to also affect earnings and (hence) income.
28 It is readily verified that if the combined 
effect of the latent personality traits that raise subjective welfare is to increase (decrease) labor 
market earnings then we will underestimate (overestimate) the SSPL.  
We may want to control for personality in measuring poverty, but we can’t if it is not 
data. For example, we can agree that people with fewer opportunities for schooling are poorer at 
given current income. In data we see that schooling is associated with higher subjective welfare 
at given current income (possibly reflecting higher expected future income for those with more 
schooling). Thus, welfare consistency appears to demand that we use a higher income poverty 
                                                           
27   See, for example, Goldberg (1993) and Heckman (2011). These traits can change over a life time, but can 
be treated as roughly constant over periods of a few years or more. 
28   Evidence on this can be found in Mueller and Plug (2006). Also see the discussion in Heckman (2011).  21 
 
line for people with less schooling. However, schooling attainments depend on individual 
personality as well as opportunities. For example, there is evidence that more conscientious 
people acquire more schooling.
29 At the same time, more conscientious people tend to delay 
gratification in other aspects of their life, which may well mean that they report lower current 
subjective welfare at given current income than do others. Then a regression for subjective 
welfare ignoring the personality differences will tend to lead one to underestimate the required 
gradient in poverty lines needed to compensate for differences in schooling opportunities.  
Even with similar personalities (or statistically ignorable differences) different people 
may apply different criteria for scaling their welfare. They have different ideas about what it 
means to be ―rich‖ or ―poor,‖ or what it means to be ―satisfied‖ or not with one’s life. Again 
latent heterogeneity in factors that are essentially irrelevant to welfare but influence responses to 
subjective welfare questions can cast doubt on the implied interpersonal comparisons of welfare 
from subjective data. If such heterogeneity was purely random then it would not invalidate 
inferences from such regressions (at least for linear models). Thus it has been argued in the 
literature that, while inter-personal welfare comparisons are invalidated by heterogeneous scales, 
the regressions are likely to be robust to such heterogeneity.
30  
However, that claim is of doubtful veracity. As already noted, it is a well-established idea 
that people assess their welfare relative to some ―comparison group‖ such as neighbors or co-
workers. This argument has emphasized relativist welfare comparisons. It has also been argued 
that reference groups play an important role in expectations formation.
31 It is a small step from 
these ideas to the proposition that survey respondents answer questions with reference to their 
immediate experiences and that this may well be highly localized in some relevant social or 
geographic dimensions. People will answer subjective questions relative to their personal 
―frame-of-reference,‖ which depends on the respondent’s own knowledge and experience, and 
therefore is likely to vary systematically with the characteristics of that person, including 
objective measures of economic welfare.  
                                                           
29   Reported in Heckman (2011), using data for Germany. 
30   For example, Frey and Stutzer (2002) note the possibility of heterogeneity in the scales used in self-
reported welfare questions but claim that this does not invalidate regression models for such data. 
31   For more recent discussions and evidence see Ravallion and Lokshin (2000) and Senik (2004). 22 
 
For example, it can be conjectured that people living in poor areas of a developing 
country tend to have a more limited knowledge of the full range of levels of living found in the 
society as a whole. Someone living in a poor, remote village who has only infrequently left the 
village and gone no further than the district town is likely to rate her welfare higher than 
someone with the same real income who lives in a city and sees far greater affluence around her. 
Similarly, it can be conjectured that well-off people are often unaware of how poor some people 
are, and may thus rate their own welfare lower on the scale. 
This can be called a frame-of-reference bias (FORB) (Ravallion, 2008b). The potential 
for FORB raises concerns about the (enumerable) regression models found in past literature. 
Consider, for example, the many papers that have used subjective welfare regressions to test for 
reference-group effects, such as whether higher neighbors’ income makes one feel worse off 
through perceptions of relative deprivation. It seems likely that the same reference group also 
influences the respondents’ interpretation of scales used in subjective questions. The reference 
group acts as both the comparator in assessing relative position and a key element of the 
information set used by respondents when interpreting the scales.  
So a cloud of doubt hangs over subjective welfare regressions, arising from concerns 
about likely heterogeneity in the interpretation of the scales used to measure subjective welfare. 
This heterogeneity undoubtedly reduces the power of standard covariates in explaining perceived 
welfare. More worrying, however, is the possibility that the heterogeneity in scales is leading to 
biased inferences from studies of subjective welfare, including biases in identifying its income 
gradient, as well as the effects of other variables such as education, employment status and 
relative economic position. Bias arises if these variables are correlated with the latent 
heterogeneity in scales. It can be conjectured that poorer people tend to have more limited 
horizons in life, due to more limited experiences with the extent of the disparities in levels of 
living in society as a whole; a poor person’s idea of what it means to be ―rich‖ may then be very 
different to that of a middle or upper income person with a very different frame of reference. 
This may be correlated with certain attributes of the household. 
Recognizing the existence of latent heterogeneity in subjective welfare can also alter the 
interpretation of some of the regressions found in the literature. Consider, for example, the 
interesting argument by Knight and Gunatilaka (2012) about the existence of an ―hedonic 23 
 
treadmill‖ in China. Recall that this was based on a regression of SWL against both answers to 
the MIQ (taken to proxy ―aspiration income‖) and actual income (with controls for some other 
observed covariates, which can be ignored for expository purposes). However, the answers to the 
MIQ may simply be picking up latent heterogeneity in subjective welfare. Indeed, it can be 
readily shown that the economic model of the SSPL outlined in section 3 implies that any latent 
individual characteristic that increases welfare will reduce 
min
i y at given own income.
32  The MIQ 
variable may not be measuring aspirations at all but simply acting as a (negative) control for 
omitted effects on subjective welfare. This will increase precision and (probably) reduce bias in 
estimating the income effect, which is strong in the Knight and Gunatilaka regressions. But this 
is clearly a very different interpretation to the idea of an hedonic treadmill. 
We have seen how much latent heterogeneity can confound the interpretation of 
subjective welfare regressions. What can be done about the problem? One possible solution is to 
control for these differences directly. Psychologists have developed various tests that can be 
implemented in surveys.
33 However, it is not as yet common to have such data collected in the 
surveys needed to study the determinants of subjective welfare. The next sub-section considers 
an econometric method of neutralizing latent heterogeneity.  
Addressing latent heterogeneity using panel data 
  Panel data on subjective welfare and covariates have been proposed as one solution to the 
problem of latent heterogeneity. If we have longitudinal data on self-assessed welfare (SW) and 
covariates (X) we postulate a model of the form: 
it i it it X SW           (i=1,..,N; t=1,…,T)        (10) 
where the error term has two components, a time-invariant effect capturing (say) personality 
traits,  i  , for which  0 ) , (  it i X Cov  , and an innovation error term,  it   with  0 ) , (  it it X Cov  . 
Thus the non-ignorable heterogeneity is assumed to be entirely captured by  i  . One can question 
                                                           
32   To see this, consider the simplified version of equations (5) and (6) where utility depends on own-income 
but there is a latent heterogeneity term, so utility is  i i y v   ) ( . The MIQ solves:  ] ) ( [ ) (
min
i i i i y v y v       . 
Differentiating w.r.t.  i  holding own-income constant we find that:  ) ( ' / ] 1 (.) ' [ /
min min
i i i y v y       . The 
conditions for existence of a unique SSPL in utility space imply that  1 (.) '   at least locally. Then  0 /
min    i i y  .   
33   The Pearlin scale is an example (Pearlin and Schooler, 1978). 24 
 
whether this econometric specification adequately captures the way heterogeneity impacts on 
subjective welfare; I will return to this point after considering some examples.  
In what appears to have been the first panel data study of subjective welfare, van de Stadt 
et al., (1985) modeled a money metric of subjective welfare in the Netherlands.  They did not 
allow for latent individual effects correlated with the covariates, but they did allow for dynamics, 
by including the lagged subjective welfare measure as a regressor, which picks up at least some 
of the heterogeneity. More recently, the papers by Winkelmann and Winkelmann (1998), 
Ravallion and Lokshin (2001) and Senik (2004) allowed for a time-invariant latent individual 
effect when modeling subjective welfare data. I will discuss the example of the Ravallion and 
Lokshin paper in more detail as this provides insights into the implications of allowing for latent 
heterogeneity for standard regression results on the determinants of subjective welfare.  
Using panel data for Russia on responses to the ELQ, Ravallion and Lokshin confirmed 
some of the results in past studies using single cross-sections, but not others. Household income 
was found to be a highly significant predictor of self-rated economic welfare. Controlling for 
household income, individual income was a far weaker predictor, suggesting that there is some 
degree of income pooling. Health shocks lowered subjective economic welfare, at given values 
of other variables in their model, including incomes. The demographic effects found in cross-
sectional studies (notably of household size, at given income per capita) were not found to be 
robust. The extent of the scale economy of household size in individual subjective welfare 
suggested by a number of papers in the literature may well reflect latent personality effects on 
the demographic characteristics of the respondent’s household.  
  In keeping with past work, Ravallion and Lokshin found evidence of an income-
compensated welfare cost of unemployment. They argue that most plausible interpretation is that 
the current welfare loss arises from some combination of lower expected future incomes and 
more uncertain incomes, the latter arising from greater exposure to uninsured risk outside the 
formal employment sector. They found that it would take a large gain in current income to 
compensate for becoming unemployed.  
  However, their results point to a number of qualifications on past findings about the 
welfare effects of unemployment. While becoming unemployed entails a large welfare loss, that 
loss is not fully restored when an unemployed person gets a job, except via the income gain. This 25 
 
implies a long-term welfare loss from even transient unemployment at given income. It also 
suggests that high unemployment benefits do not attract people out of work, but they may well 
discourage a return to work. Also, the unemployment effect was not found to be robust to 
restricting the sample to those for whom incomes were almost certainly better measured. This 
suggests that there could well be a bias in past estimates of the (income-compensated) welfare 
effect of unemployment, arising from the structure of income measurement errors.   
  These panel data models impose considerable structure on the way in which latent 
heterogeneity is deemed to matter to subjective welfare, namely that it takes the form of a 
individual specific time-invariant and additive component of the error term. I turn next to another 
source of data that offers a more flexible and robust way of addressing concerns about latent 
heterogeneity in scales.   
Using vignettes to address heterogeneity in scales  
The essential idea of vignettes in this context is to include in the survey (or a sub-sample) 
reasonably detailed descriptions of the lives of certain stylized individuals and ask the 
respondent the same subjective question about those vignettes that was posed about the 
respondent herself.  
Vignettes to have been used in a number of recent studies of subjective data on (inter 
alia) health status, political efficacy and job satisfaction. King et al. (2004) and King and Wand 
(2007) designed vignettes to establish common points on the heterogeneous reference scales 
regarding political efficacy in China and Mexico. Kristensen and Johansson (2008) used 
vignettes in anchoring subjective scales for job satisfaction. Bago d’Uva et al. (2008) used them 
for correcting self-assessed health data for reporting bias. Vignettes have also been used in 
testing the competence of doctors (Das et al., 2008). Kapteyn et al. (2008) used vignettes to 
compare life satisfaction between respondents in the U.S. and the Netherlands. 
  Beegle, Himelein and Ravallion (BHR) (2012) used vignettes to provide various tests for 
bias due to latent heterogeneity in individual scales of subjective welfare. Their tests entailed 
adding vignettes to a national household survey for Tajikistan in 2007. Respondents placed these 
vignettes on the same six-step ladder used to report their own subjective economic welfare. BHR 
performed three sets of tests for bias. In their first test, they found some significant covariates for 26 
 
vignette responses amongst the regressors commonly used to explain subjective welfare. 
However, the effects were neither very strong nor consistent across different vignettes.  
In their second and third tests, BHR explored the extent of bias due to the aforementioned 
frame of reference effect by embedding vignette rankings by households in standard regressions 
for subjective welfare. BHR did this in two ways: they included vignettes among the covariates 
and, to address endogeneity concerns with this approach, BHR also recalibrated the self-
assessments of welfare to accord with the heterogeneity in scales revealed by the vignette 
responses. The striking finding of these tests is that the bias is negligible with respect to the 
―income effect‖ on subjective welfare as well as other covariates. Based on this study, the 
concerns that past uses of subjective economic welfare data are compromised by systematic 
differences in the meaning given to the scales used appear to be unwarranted.  
A third test by BHR involved estimating an explicit model of the heterogeneity in scales, 
whereby the thresholds are modeled as functions of covariates, assuming that the structure of this 
heterogeneity is common between ―own welfare‖ and the vignettes.
34 As usual, there is assumed 
to be a continuous latent variable for the respondents’ self-rated welfare, but now the thresholds 
are explicit functions of a vector of explanatory variables. The extra information on the vignette 
responses provides the basis for identification, under the assumption that the thresholds for self-
assessed welfare are determined identically as for these thresholds in the vignette responses. This 
is a natural assumption to make. Without the vignettes, identification would only be possible 
under questionable assumptions about the nonlinearity of the functional forms involved (as 
discussed in King et al., 2004). Thus BHR were able to model determinants of the thresholds 
separately to those of the latent continuous variable for subjective welfare. 
This approach revealed similar results on the factors influencing subjective welfare, but 
also threw new light on the heterogeneity in scales. In particular, BHR found that poorer 
households tend to have a narrower range in the thresholds used in identifying where they lie and 
where the vignettes lie on the subjective welfare ladder.  
                                                           
34   Here BHR followed an approach developed by King et al., (2004) who proposed an econometric method 
(―CHOPIT‖) for modeling the same type of data use by BHR in which there is an equation for both the latent 
response of interest and one for the vignettes, with the two equations estimated jointly. 27 
 
A frame-of-reference effect on subjective welfare is evident in BHR’s findings; people 
with different socioeconomic backgrounds use systematically different scales in responding to 
questions on their welfare. However, BHR’s results do not suggest that this is an important 
source of bias in past efforts to model the objective determinants of subjective welfare, and for 
retrieving social subjective poverty lines. This is encouraging for future applications. 
Latent heterogeneity in weights 
  So far the discussion has focused on the problem of heterogeneity in self-assessed 
welfare, interpreted as either an additive effect on the underlying continuous welfare level or in 
the ordinal scales used in the survey. However, there is another concern that has received little or 
no attention in this context.  
Recall that one objective of the exercise is to use subjective welfare data to help 
determine the weights on various non-income dimensions of welfare—to inform choices in 
constructing a multidimensional index of poverty. It appears very likely that different people 
have different weights given that non-market goods are included, and so there is no market 
mechanism to bring marginal rates of substitution into parity across people.   
What then does the standard subjective-welfare regression give us? It appears to be 
widely thought that the regression coefficients can be interpreted as the average weights for the 
population.
35 However, that interpretation requires some rather strong behavioral assumptions. 
To see why, note first that the differences in weights across the sample will end up in the error 
term of the regression model. Then a key issue is whether the heterogeneity in the weighted 
idiosyncratic welfare determinants is correlated with the dimensions of welfare one is interested 
in. If it is then we have an example of what (in the context of impact evaluations) Heckman et al. 
(2006) term ―essential heterogeneity.‖ In the present context, let us continue to suppose that 
subjective welfare is a linear function of  i X , as in equation (9) with  0 ) , (  i i X Cov  , but now 
allow the weights to vary across people, so that  i i       is the weight for person i and   is 
the population mean weight. Then equation (9) becomes: 
) ( i i i i i i i i X X X SW                         (11) 
                                                           
35   See, for example, the discussion in Kingdon and Knight (2006). 28 
 
The composite error term in parentheses contains the heterogeneity in weights. Now it is far from 
clear what standard subjective welfare regressions are telling us. Even if  0 ) , (  i i X Cov  , a linear 
regression model for subjective welfare will not in general deliver the mean weights in the 
population in large samples. That requires that the interaction effects between the latent 
differences in weights and the values taken by the covariates are orthogonal to those covariates, 
i.e., that  0 ) , (  i i i X X Cov  .  However, we can easily imagine that people with high weights on 
some welfare dimension tend to be better endowed with that dimension ( 0 ) , (  i i i X X Cov  ); this 
may reflect parental decisions on schooling, say. Then (ignoring all other problems) the 
regression coefficient will tend to over-estimate the mean weight. Alternatively, suppose that 
people with low innate attributes (such as health) tend to put a higher value on those attributes; 
then one could find that  0 ) , (  i i i X X Cov  . We will underestimate the mean weight. 
  Thus the likely heterogeneity in the weights attached to non-market goods clouds 
inferences from subjective-welfare regressions. Indeed, while one would presumably like to find 
weights appropriate to the trade-offs of poor people, it is far from clear that the weights implied 
by standard regressions are appropriate. One could try to model the heterogeneity in weights by 
adding interaction effects. This will presumably help, although latent heterogeneity in weights 
can never be ruled out.  
A possible direction for research is to use surveys to try to focus directly on the 
subjective tradeoffs adopted by respondents. This would require more complicated and difficult 
survey questions, but a not dissimilar approach has been used with some success for inferring 
attributes of preferences, such as risk aversion or valuations of environmental factors.    
6.   Conclusions 
Subjective data offer to expand the information set traditionally used for assessing 
welfare and measuring poverty. Self-assessed welfare is not equated with welfare. Rather, the 
promise of subjective data is to help identify the weights on the dimensions of welfare for which 
prices are missing (or unreliable) and in determining the social subjective poverty line—below 
which people tend to think they are poor, but above which they do not.  29 
 
Some variables with explanatory power for subjective welfare may not be relevant for 
measuring poverty. Personality traits, for example, are expected to influence self-assessed 
welfare but are unlikely to carry much weight in deciding if one person is poorer than another. 
And even when personality traits are not data, they are likely to influence the observed covariates 
of self-assessed welfare. In the end, one cannot escape the need for normative judgments about 
what should be included in a measure of poverty.  
The existence of confounding ―non-welfare‖ factors in survey-based measures of 
subjective welfare is a continuing concern. Practitioners should not presume that these variables 
are statistically harmless for the purpose at hand. There are a number of reasons for expecting 
biases in the subjective welfare regressions found in the literature, especially those using cross-
sectional data. However, some encouragement can also be found in the recent literature. For 
example, while there are frame-of-reference effects—whereby the scales in subjective questions 
are interpreted differently depending on the respondent’s knowledge and experience—the biases 
turned out to be quite small in the one study to date using vignettes to eliminate the heterogeneity 
in subjective scales for a developing country.  
A potentially important problem that has received no attention (to my knowledge) is 
latent heterogeneity across individuals in their welfare weights—as must be expected for non-
market goods. Those weights may well reflect endowments of the welfare covariates, or the 
covariates may come to reflect the differing weights. Then we do not know whose trade-offs the 
subjective-welfare regression is giving us; we would like to use weights favored by poor people, 
but that cannot be assured. Further research might usefully explore the possibilities of deriving a 
locally valid estimator using innovative survey or experimental methods to identify personal 
tradeoffs.    30 
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